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Abstract: Despite cryptographic breakthroughs in the area of
digital cash and the rapid advance of information technology,
physical cash remains the dominant currency: it is easy to use
and its exchanges are largely independent of computing devices.
However, physical cash is vulnerable to rising threats such as
high quality, government-mandated forgeries. Can a hybrid of
physical and digital cash protect more effectively against these
threats? We discuss the rise of high-quality counterfeits and
review technological solutions to thwart such threats.
Specifically, we study mechanisms to combine physical cash with
digital cash to remove their respective shortcomings and obtain
their combined advantages. The mechanisms range from
cryptographic signatures embedded in 2-D barcodes to online
verification systems assisted by physical one-way functions.
Notably, we compare these different proposals by looking at
them through the prism of economics, and examining their cost
and benefit trade-offs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Counterfeiting money is arguably as old as minting money. Fake
coins have been discovered dating back to the 4th century B.C.6
During World War II, both Allied and Axis powers contemplated
flooding their adversaries with forged banknotes.7 While the Allies
eventually decided against implementing the attack,8 Nazi Germany
went ahead with the plan, and produced high quality forgeries of
British Pound banknotes. While its effects were not necessarily
negligible, the attack was hardly a success in terms of monetary
destabilization.
More recently, circumstantial evidence of a nation-state issuing
large amounts of nearly perfect counterfeit US dollars ("supernotes")
may have surfaced.9 But where Nazi Germany's counterfeiting
strategies during World War II relied mostly on master counterfeiters
and their human labor (highly skilled, but time consuming), today's
digital printing technologies make it possible to produce vast amounts
of counterfeited currencies in limited periods of time. From a security
engineering standpoint, the mere possibility of modern, high-quality
forgeries produced by hostile governments or sophisticated third-
party attackers with access to considerable resources calls for a
reevaluation of the traditional threat model used to design anti-
counterfeiting techniques, both in terms of technology available, and
potential magnitude of the losses. Regardless of whether the
counterfeiters are actually employed by a government, or
transnational criminal syndicate, the appearance of what we term
high-quality monetary forgery marks a significant departure from
6 G. Giovanelli et al.,"A Puzzling Mule Coin from the Parabita Hoard: a Material
Characterization" (paper presented at the Cavallino Archaeometry Workshop, Lecce, Italy,
May 2006).
7 L. Malkin. Krueger's Men: The Secret Nazi Counterfeit Plot and the Prisoners of Block 19.
Little, Brown and Company, 2006.
8 Both on political and economic grounds. A May 1942 exchange between Sigismund David
Waley (at the British Treasury) and John Maynard Keynes (the famous economist) can be
found in documents made available by [26]. In the exchange, the two gentlemen reject the
plan, "as the amount which could be introduced would not make any appreciable
difference." See http://www.lawrencemalkin.com/kruegers-men-the-secret-documents-2-
3-1.html.
9 S. Mihm, "No Ordinary Counterfeit," New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006, 36.
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traditional forgery (e.g., that perpetrated by smaller organized crime
outfits) in scale, motivation, and perception.
We define high-quality as follows: we assume that the
counterfeiting entity has access to manufacturing resources and
capabilities that can be considered equivalent in quality and
production levels to that of the national bank whose currency is being
faked. As a result, the counterfeited notes are indistinguishable from
the legitimate currencies, unless sophisticated (and therefore very
costly) forensic analysis is employed.1° While these counterfeits may
simply be used to increase the purchasing power of the entity
producing the forgeries, the forged bills may also be used to finance
hostile activities, such as weapons purchases, bribing of spies, or
terrorism sponsorship. Consequently, targeted countries may be
willing to consider relatively expensive defenses against such high-
quality forgeries.
On the other hand, the development of the Internet has presided
over a considerable expansion of infrastructures for online
transactions and has fostered large-scale deployment of security
technologies such as cryptographic verification. By making feasible a
host of online verification schemes, increased connectivity may be an
important asset in the design of novel anti-counterfeit defenses.
We offer the following contributions with this paper: we
investigate the economic impact of counterfeiting attacks and we
examine the feasibility of a set of technological solutions, both offline
and online, against counterfeiting, given the economic constraints
imposed by the volume of banknotes in production and circulation. In
particular, we discuss the main technical and economic challenges
related to the design and deployment of possible countermeasures
against high-quality monetary forgery, and debate whether
technology-based solutions, such as electronic cash, may be an answer
to those challenges.
One of the main motivating factors for this study is that, despite
major developments in paperless currency over the past decade,
physical cash remains widely used throughout the world. As such, the
entry barrier for adoption of alternate proposals is extremely high. An
appealing aspect of physical cash is that people can trade it without
the assistance of computing devices. People expect that simple visual
and tactile inspection reveals fake bills. Physical cash can survive
extreme situations: it can endure a cycle in a washing machine and it
lo S. Mihm, "No Ordinary Counterfeit," New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006, 36.
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can survive extreme temperatures that would render any smartcard
unusable. Although not perfectly anonymous1 , physical cash,
especially smaller and widely circulated bills, provides a reasonable
level of privacy.
On the other hand, paperless, cryptographic digital cash offers
numerous benefits, and provides two key advantages over physical
money. First, an adversary cannot forge digital cash, assuming the
security of the cryptographic mechanisms and the secrecy of the
associated cryptographic information are preserved. Second,
replication of digital cash is easy, so that one can easily safeguard
against loss or theft of digital cash through digital backups.
The idea to use digital cash as a solution against money
counterfeiting is not new, and was in fact suggested as soon as the first
practical digital cash schemes were available.12 This has received
considerable interest from the technical community.3 Counterfeit
resilience also spurred a large body of research as one application of
quantum cryptography,14 although current quantum cryptography
implementations are still far from being practical. More recent efforts
(e.g., R. Balan et al., "mFerio: The design and evaluation of a peer to-peer
mobile payment system"15) argue that with the ubiquity of cellular
phones and PDAs, mobile devices can greatly facilitate adoption of
digital cash by the masses.
However, the transaction, coordination, and social costs
associated with any large scale switch to digital cash explain why, in
spite of the advance of cell phones and credit cards, we are still far
from becoming a cashless society, especially in many developing
nations.16 It may be more beneficial for an economy to preserve the
,1 D. Kiigler, "On the Anonymity of Banknotes" (paper presented at the 4th International
Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET'o4), Toronto, Canada, May 2004).
12 L. Malkin, Krueger's Men: The Secret Nazi Counterfeit Plot and the Prisoners of Block
19, Little, Brown and Company, 2006.
13 See Patiwat Panurach, "Money in electronic commerce: digital cash, electronic fund
transfer, and ecash." Commun. ACM, 39(6):45-50, 1996.
14 See S. Wiesner, "Conjugate Coding," SIGACTNews, 15(1):78-88, 1983.
15 R. Balan et al., "mFerio: The design and evaluation of a peer to-peer mobile payment
system" (paper presented at the Seventh ACM/USENIX Annual International Conference
on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys 'o9), Krakow, Poland, June 2009).
16 Even developed nations at the forefront of technological advances rely heavily on
physical cash. For instance, for a variety of reasons discussed by Mann [27], Japanese
society has traditionally been relatively reluctant to use credit and debit card transactions.
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appealing aspects of physical cash, including its ubiquitous
deployment, and combine those with the advantages of digital cash-
in essence, a kind of physical-digital money.
Indeed, a few hybrid solutions coupling physical security with
cryptographic verification have been suggested.7 Each has its own
specific trade-offs. By embedding an easily verifiable cryptographic
value in regular bills,18 the issuing government can combine physical
and digital cash without requiring drastic changes to the underlying
existing monetary infrastructure. However, devising such bills, or
physical-digital cash, also leads to a number of design trade-offs
between the security properties achieved, the technological complexity
involved, and the economic costs incurred. In this paper, we explore
the trade-offs of these and alternative solutions in search of
deployable anti-counterfeiting techniques, noting that recent advances
in large-scale communications and databases can provide additional
layers of defense against forgery.
After surveying existing anti-counterfeiting technological solutions
and related work on digital cash in Part II, we use an economic
framework in Part III to inform design requirements for counterfeit-
resistant bills, which is examined in Part IV. We contrast the
advantages and disadvantages of several schemes in Part V. These
schemes offer various levels of protection against both basic theft and
attempts at high-quality forgery. We then analyze general security
threats against physical-digital cash in Part VI, and offer some final
remarks in Part VII.
17 A. Acquisti et al., "Countermeasures against government-scale monetary forgery." In
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
Data Security (FC'o8), pages 262-266, Cozumel, Mexico, January 2008; [22] H. Hoshino,
et al. "Object to be checked for authenticity and a method for manufacturing the same,"
February 1997. US Patent nr. 5,6Ol,931; [37] Ravikanth Pappu et al., "Physical one-way
functions." Science, 297(5589):2026-2030, 2002.; [45] G. J. Simmons. "Identification of
data, devices, documents and individuals." In Proc. 25th Ann. Intern. Carnahan
Conference on Security Technology, pages 197-218, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, October 1991.
IEEE.
18 In this paper we focus our discussion on bills, although the principles we present could
be translated to coins as well. Given the lower economic value of coins and their high cost
of production, counterfeiting coins is usually not effective.
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II. RELATED WORK
Proposals to combat monetary forgery by building protection into
the currency can be classified into three groups: physical protection of
currency, digital alternatives to cash, and hybrid approaches, which
attempt to combine physical features with digital enhancements.
A. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
In the area of physical protection against counterfeits, each
currency-printing nation has developed its own secret techniques.
However, a number of public features enable people to visually inspect
and verify the authenticity of each bill. For example, the U.S. Bureau
of Printing and Engraving publishes details about some of the features
of new U.S. dollars, such as color-shifting ink, a new watermark, a
metallic security thread, and the use of micro print.19 Euro bank notes
also provide numerous security features, including raised print,
watermarks, a security thread, see-through numbers, holograms, a
glossy stripe, a color-changing number, and UV-visible features.20 The
most valuable bank note in the world, the looo Swiss Franc bill,
includes a kinegram, an irodin number, a watermark, UV-visible
features, numbers visible only under oblique incident light (the Kipp
effect), and the use of copper print, micro perforation, and optically
variable ink.21 Recent research showed that even for common types of
paper, random, natural imperfections occurring in the paper texture
make it possible to authenticate documents,22 which could, of course,
be useful for counterfeit resilience.
19 U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Accessed August 30, 2010.
http://www.bep.treas.gov/document.cfm/18/io6.
20 Euro Banknotes - Security Features" European Central Bank, accessed August 30, 2010,
http://www.ecb.int/bc/banknotes/ security/html/index.en.html.
21 Schweizerische Nationalbank, Banque Nationale Suisse. Die aktuelle banknotenserie.
http://www.snb. ch/d/banknoten/aktuelle-serie/aktuelle serie.html.
22 William Clarkson et al., "Fingerprinting blank paper using commodity scanners." (paper
presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2009.)
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B. DIGITAL ALTERNATIVES TO CASH
Many researchers have proposed and studied implementations of
digital cash schemes. Asokan et al. 23 provide an overview article of
electronic payment systems. The key idea is to provide an alternative
to existing cash-based payment systems that dispense paper money to
users, and replace it with cryptographically-verifiable electronic
tokens.
Based on seminal work on blind signatures,24 one line of research
focuses on cryptographic digital cash systems. 25 Similarly, several
micropayment systems have also been proposed to pay for very small
amounts.26 The core motivation for the line of work in micropayments
is not to increase transaction security, but instead to provide
economically efficient alternatives to credit card payments (which
incur relatively high processing fees) for small transactions. In terms
of security primitives, rather than trying to defeat existing
counterfeiting operations, micropayments focus on providing security
guarantees to emulate existing currency usage-for instance, by
making it impossible for a specific user to spend the same coin twice
on different transactions.
Another line of research focuses on trusted hardware-based
payment systems 27 such as electronic wallets. In particular, the
23 N. Asokan et al. "State of the Art in Electronic Payment Systems' Advances in
Computers 43 (2000): 425-449.
24 David Chaum, "Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments" (paper presented at
CRYPTO'82, 1982).
25 See D. Chaum, "Untraceable electronic cash." In Proc. CRYPTO'88, pages 319-327,
1988.
26 Benjamin Cox, et al., "NetBill Security and Transaction Protocol" (paper presented at the
1st USENIX Workshop on E-Commerce, New York, NY, 1995); Steve Glassman et al., "The
MilliCent Protocol for Inexpensive Electronic Commerce" (paper presented at.WWW'95,
Boston, MA, December 1995); Ronald Rivest, "Electronic Lottery Tickets as
Micropayments," Presented at the International Conference on Financial Cryptography
and Data Security 1997, Anguilla, BWI, February 1997, pages 307-314.; Ronald Rivest and
Adi Shamir, "PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes," Presented at
the Int'l Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, UK, April 1997, pages 69 - 88.
27Jean-Paul Boly et al.,"The ESPRIT Project CAFE -High Security Digital Payment
Systems" (paper presented at ESORICS'94, 1994); Mondex.
http://www.mondex.com/mondex/home.htm; Sony Corporation. Overview of FeliCa.
http://www.sony.net/Products/felica/abt/dvs. html.
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Mondex system28 and the CAFE project29 proposed portable trusted
hardware devices to store an account balance and perform electronic
payments. The FeliCa card3o proposed by Sony is a type of RFID-
based electronic wallet becoming increasingly popular in East Asia.
Japanese railways (JR East and West) use FeliCa for train passes, and
the Octopus Card in Hong Kong uses FeliCa as a debit card. FeliCa's
popularity is partly due to its seamless integration in some cell phones
handsets. More recent proposals investigate how cell phones can
become a digital wallet and replace cash.31
C. HYBRID APPROACHES (PHYSICAL-DIGITAL CASH)
In an attempt to enhance existing bank notes, hybrid approaches
include cryptographic materials within "usual" bills. The idea is to
maintain compatibility with the existing monetary infrastructure,
while providing electronic enhancements that can be used by parties
who wish to do so to verify the genuineness of a given bill.
For instance, in 2001, the European Central Bank considered
embedding RFID tags in each Euro note.32 These tags would give each
bill a unique identifier and embed cryptographic material attesting to
the validity of the note. A few other proposals have attempted to
couple physical security, using physical one-way functions,33 with
cryptographic verification of the bill.34
28 Mondex, "What is Mondex". http://www.mondex.com/mondex/home.htm.
29 Jean-Paul Boly et al., "The ESPRIT Project CAFE -High Security Digital Payment
Systems" (paper presented at ESORICS'94, 1994).
30 Sony Corporation. Overview of FeliCa. http://www.sony.net/Products/felica/abt/dvs.
html.
31 R. Balan et al., "mFerio: The design and evaluation of a peer-to-peer mobile payment
system." (paper presented at the Seventh ACM/USENIX Annual International Conference
on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys 'o9), Krakow, Poland, June 2009.
32 Junko Yoshida, "Euro bank notes to embed RFID chips by 2005.' EE Times (2001).
http://www.eetimes.com/ story/OEG20011219Soo16, December 2001.
33 Ravikanth Pappu et al., "Physical One-way Functions," Science, 297(5589) (2002):
2026-2030, 2002.
34 H. Hoshino, et al., "Object to be Checked for Authenticity and a Method for
Manufacturing the ame," February 1997. US Patent No. 5,6Ol,931; [45] G. J. Simmons.
"Identification of data, devices, documents and individuals." (paper presented at the 25th
Ann. Intern. Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, pages 197-218, Taipei,
Taiwan, ROC, October 1991.)
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In Part V. we discuss and contrast the trade-offs associated with
the above approaches, as well as novel approaches introduced in this
paper. Before doing so, we consider the economic impact of forgeries,
in order to better understand the technological and economic trade-
offs a government faces when deploying counterfeit-resistant bills.
III. ECONOMICS OF COUNTERFEITING
This Part highlights the economic implications of counterfeiting,
focusing on large-scale, high-tech counterfeiting that new
technologies have made possible. We first consider the perspective of
the defender, analyzing the costs and benefits of engaging in various
strategies to fight forgeries; we then consider the benefits for the
attackers, and relate them to the destabilizing effects that forgeries
can have on an economy. The discussion of these effects leads us to
consider constraints on the costs of new countermeasures.
A. COMBATING COUNTERFEITING
Efforts to combat counterfeiting can focus on three broad areas:
policing (actively pursuing counterfeiters and their distribution
channels, and reducing the incentives to engage in counterfeiting by
punishing violators), building protection into the currency, and
detecting counterfeits in circulation.
In the United States, anti-counterfeiting has been historically
tackled by the United States Secret Service (USSS), which now
operates under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Even
though the USSS is perhaps most famous for being in charge of
protection of high-ranking diplomats and heads of state, including the
US President, combating financial crimes (including currency
counterfeiting) is its main activity.
Hence, investigating the DHS budget can give a sense of the
amounts invested by the US government into policing and detecting
counterfeits in circulation. The (USSS) operates on a US $1.4 billion
budget. Out of this budget, somewhere between $270 million and
$300 million per year are used to fight financial crimes;35 most of this
budget is directed toward domestic and international field
operations.36
35 Department of Homeland Security. FY 2o09 Budget Details, 2009.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-fy2009.pdf.
36 Department of Homeland Security. 2009. FY 20o9 Budget Details, 2009.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-fy2o9.pdf.
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It is hard to infer exactly how much of this budget is devoted to
anti-counterfeiting, as the USSS also deals with online crime, money
laundering, and other forms of financial crimes. However, the USSS
claims they prevent between $1 billion and $4 billion per year in
financial losses due to counterfeiting and other monetary crimes37
The USSS also reports that the amount of counterfeits in circulation
represents less than o.o% of the total currency in circulation (the
actual estimate in 2007 was 0.0079%).38
The Federal Reserve Board budget for 200939 also provides some
insight into the costs of building security into the currency. Current
$20 and $50 dollar bills cost almost 10 cents per bill to produce. New
$1oo bills cost 13 cents each. On the other hand, the costs to produce
$1/$2 bills are in the 5-cent/unit range. Printing represents 96% of
the currency budget. Counterfeit-deterrence research is about $4.2
million per year-a small amount compared to the resources invested
in policing. The research budget has however seen an increase of 15%
over the past year.
B. INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN COUNTERFEITING MONEY
One key motivation for embedding more physical security features
in banknotes is that counterfeiters now have access to reasonably
high-quality printing equipment for a fraction of the amount it used to
cost. Color printers and scanners, once prohibitively expensive, can
now be purchased even under a limited budget; and while such
equipment can only provide low-quality counterfeits, it is worth
noting that this does not deter counterfeiters. Indeed, according to the
USSS, in 2001, about 39% of the $47.5 million in seized counterfeit
money that entered circulation in the United States was made using
computers or scanners. In 1995, the figure was less than a half
percent.40 Such an increase suggests that counterfeiters have strong
37 See Department of Homeland Security. FY 2oo9 Budget Details, 2009, p. 1858.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budgetfy2oo9.pdf.
38 See Department of Homeland Security. FY 2009 Budget Details, 2009, p. 1838.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-fy2o09.pdf.
39 "2oo9 New Currency Budget," The Federal Reserve Board, accessed August 30, 2010,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/2oo9newcurrency.htm.
40 C. Marshall, "Paper or Plastic? Currency Making is in Flux." New York Times, July 14,
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incentives to produce low-quality counterfeits: production costs are
extremely low, and remain inferior to the expected returns.
To better understand the value of counterfeit money, notice that
the counterfeit "supply chain" is usually more complex than a simple
producer-consumer relationship. Counterfeiters are unlikely to
directly inject the counterfeit bills into the market, and instead will
pass them on to (a chain of) intermediaries that will exchange the
counterfeit money at a discounted price for other goods, before trying
to pass them onto the next element of the supply chain at a higher
value.41 Eventually, the principal who injects the currency into the
market hopes to obtain face value (i.e., cash out $1oo for a counterfeit
$1oo bill), after having spent significantly less to obtain the
counterfeit (e.g., $70 for a supernote). However, the risks of getting
caught are considerably higher when injecting the currency into the
market than they are when exchanging the counterfeits for goods or
services (provided the other party to the transaction knows and agrees
that counterfeits are being used). In particular, counterfeit currency
has been known to be accepted as a legitimate means of payment in
the context of the drug trade. Repasky reports that counterfeits of high
quality can be used at about 33 cents on the dollar in exchange for
drugs.42 The fact that counterfeit currency facilitates the drug trade
provides a strong impetus to governments to try to thwart counterfeit
money.
In such a context, an extremely high-quality counterfeit, i.e., a
"supernote," such as those that may be produced by rogue states or
large crime syndicates by using the same printing technologies
employed by the respective governments, can return about 60 to 70
cents on the dollar to the counterfeiter.43 This price not only reflects
higher production costs, but also a considerably lower risk of getting
caught for the party injecting the bill into the market.
41 R. Perl and D. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," 2007,
Congressional Research Service report RL33324. Available online at
http ://opencrs.com/document/RL33324/2007-o1-17/.
42 R. Repasky, "Currency and Financial Crimes in the New Millennium." In Protection,
Security, Safeguards: Practical Approaches and Perspectives. Los Angles: Henley-
Putnam University, 2000, 197 - 211.
43 R. Perl and D. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," 2007,
Congressional Research Service report RL33324. Available online at
http://opencrs.com/document/RL33324/2007-01-17/.
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C. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FORGERIES
So far, we have mostly considered criminal motives for producing
counterfeits. Could there be political motives that go far beyond mere
profit, in the production of forgeries? At least in principle, a large-
scale forgery produced by a hostile government could increase the
monetary base enough to affect the rate of inflation in the targeted
nation and decrease national and international confidence in that
currency, further destabilizing its exchange rate. Is this a practical
threat?
The United States has, in the past, experienced periods of
monetary instability caused by large amounts of forged currencies in
their money supply. For instance, it is estimated that at the end of the
Civil War, between one-third and one-half of U.S. currency was
counterfeit.a4 Yet, market economies can be resilient to shocks in their
monetary supplies: less than ten years after the end of the war, the
amount of forged U.S. currency in circulation had been drastically
reduced.
According to the so-called quantity theory of money,45 the effect
on inflation of an increase in the money supply can be estimated by
comparing the rate of money growth to the change in money velocity
(the number of times currency turns over in a year) and the change in
real gross domestic product. Assuming, for instance, that Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and velocity are not changing, an increase of
x% in the money supply will cause an approximate increase of x% in
the inflation rate. To give a sense of these dynamics using our previous
example, between 1861 and 1864 the Confederate money supply
increased 11.5 times, causing commodity prices to increase 28 times.46
As of February 2oo6, the U.S. money supply totaled about $780
billion.47 However, at the time, only "$45 million in [ ...] supernotes
[high quality forgeries] [ ...] have been detected in circulation," and an
44 Lee McIntyre, "Making Money Keeps Getting Easier," Regional Review, Quarter 2
(2000).
45 Irving Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and Relation to
Credit, Interest and Crises (New York: Macmillan, 1911).
46 Eugene Lerner, "Money, Prices, and Wages in the Confederacy, 1861-1865" Journal of
Political Economy, 63(1):2o-4o, 1954.
47 R. Perl and D. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," 2007,
Congressional Research Service report RL33324. Available online at
http://opencrs.com/document/RL33324/2007-ol-17/.
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estimated total of $180 million forged U.S. banknotes were in
circulation worldwide. Even using the latter value, forgeries only
account for around o.o% percent of total currency. Under these
values, it would take a 200x increase in forged money production to
corrupt 1% of the monetary supply of the US and have a mere 1%
impact on inflation.
An increase by 200 times seems difficult to achieve. While the
production costs of decent quality counterfeiting are decreasing
thanks to advancement in cheap printing, scanning, and imaging
technologies, high-quality forgeries, such as supernotes, are likely
expensive to create. Their fixed costs are significant, because they
require equipment as sophisticated as those of national note printing
presses. For instance, supernotes must be based on "intaglio" methods
from identical presses used by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, which are available only from a single manufacturer in
Switzerland.48 In addition, equipment of that type (and distribution
channels to inject significant amounts of forged notes into a nation) is
not easy to hide. Avoiding police detection implies additional costs.
Finally, while the forgers may be busy trying to increase their
production above the current level of $18o million, the U.S. Bureau of
Engraving and Printing would still be able to produce "26 million
notes in a day with a face value of approximately $907 million"49-
more than eleven times the estimated number of existing supernotes
in circulation.
To achieve such a significant scale in production, a hostile
government would have to bear significant costs and engage in large-
scale activities that may make it detectable by the U.S. Secret Service
agents abroad,5o or by international organizations such as the Central
Bank Counterfeit Deterrence Group (CBCDG). As such, the direct
macroeconomic impact of forgeries appears to be negligible.
D. INDIRECT EFFECTS
However, injecting forgeries into an economy may affect the
economy indirectly, as we describe below.
48 Lee McIntyre, "Making Money Keeps Getting Easier," Regional Review, Quarter 2
(2000).
49 From: http://www.bep.treas.gov/document.cfm/18/lo6. (last visited August 30, 2010).
5o GAO. Counterfeit U.S. Currency Abroad: Issues and U.S. Deterrence Efforts. Letter
Report, 02/26/96, GAO/GGD96-11, 1996.
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1. MONEY MULTIPLIER EFFECTS
First, with the increasing sophistication of financial markets, the
concept of money supply has also kept expanding, leading to possible
ricochet effects that can magnify the impact of an inflow of forged
money into a nation's monetary base. Economists distinguish Mo (the
monetary base that includes all physical currency and the central bank
accounts that can be exchanged for physical currency) from Mi (which
includes Mo and checking accounts) and M2 (which includes, among
others, Mi and most savings and money market accounts). Monetary
expansion implies that an increase in one form of monetary
instrument-for instance, an increase in banknotes circulated in the
economy-will expand through the monetary supply via a "multiplier"
effect.51 As an example of this multiplier effect, a forged $1oo dollar
bill deposited at a banking institution and then released in circulation
results in $200 of fake money being in the system-the $1oo
deposited, plus the bill that has just been brought back into
circulation.52 Hence, multiplier effects may enlarge the macro impact
of mass amounts of forged notes more than a simple contamination of
the currency pool would suggest. Historical data on Mo, Mi and M2
(available from the St. Louis Federal Reserve53) suggest that, since the
mid-198os, M2/Mo is between 5 and 8, with smaller values occurring
in times of recession, i.e., when the monetary supply is increased.
Hence, even considering multiplier effects, the macroeconomic impact
of supernotes is unlikely to be very significant.
2. POLICY MOTIVATIONS
Solely focusing on the arguably small macroeconomic impact of
supernotes, however, misses a more disturbing motivation that may
be driving their creation. The forger may not just try to destabilize the
target nation's economy, but may instead attempt to inject hard-to-
5' Frederic Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets,
Addison-Wesley, 7th edition, 2004.
52 As noted in the Introduction, "supernotes" are virtually indistinguishable from the
legitimate currencies, unless highly specialized and costly forensic analysis is
employed.
53 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Monetary Aggregates, 2009. http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/24.
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detect money into a black market in order to enhance other more
dangerous operations, such as terrorism.
Since two-thirds of the total U.S. currency supply are held
overseas (with the $100 bill being more widespread abroad than in the
United States54), and since the number of forged notes keeps
increasing, while their cost decreases, the risk that increasingly larger
amounts will be used to indirectly attack the interests of a nation state
is concrete. As discussed above, the US Secret Service is already
devoting "a large portion of [its] budget"55 to anti-counterfeiting
activities. Since the U.S. Secret Service 2005 budget request totaled
$1.4 billion,56 even a small fraction of that budget would seem to be
more than the actual amount of forged U.S. bills currently in
circulation-suggesting strong policy motivations for stronger forms
of counterfeit prevention.
3. LOCAL DESTABILIZATION EFFECTS
A potentially thorny issue with counterfeit notes is that money
travels relatively slowly. A study 57 based on available online data of
bill circulation in the United States58 shows that, after a year, almost a
fifth of all notes have traveled less than 5o kilometers. About a quarter
have traveled more than 8oo km, while the rest (57.3%) have traveled
between 5o and 8oo kilometers. The study further shows that the
distance traveled by currency overall grows with the time since
injection of the currency. More precisely, currency does not move
outside of a local radius for a while and then "jumps" to a distant place
(presumably due to travel), and remains there for a while, before
repeating the process.
This relatively low mobility has two very distinct effects from a
security perspective. On the one hand, it makes it easier to identify the
origin of injection of forged notes, which in turn can lead to easier
54 Lee McIntyre, "Making Money Keeps Getting Easier," Regional Review, Quarter 2
(2000).
55 Lee McIntyre, "Making Money Keeps Getting Easier," Regional Review, Quarter 2
(2000).
56 Evamarie Socha, "Doing Business With the U.S. Secret Service. " Washington
Technology, 18(24), 2004.
57 D. Brockmann et al., "The Scaling Laws of Human Travel." Nature, 439(2oo6), 462-465.
58 See http://www.wheresgeorge.com (accessed August 31, 2010).
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identification of the perpetrators. On the other hand, it makes it
appealing for an attacker to try a massive, localized injection of bills in
a highly concentrated market (e.g., New York City) in hopes of
destabilizing the local market.
While monetary inflation due to an increase in the supply of
money in general affects prices at the macroeconomic level, price
inflation can at times be a local phenomenon (for instance when a
local shortage of goods-such as water or food after a natural
disaster-causes their prices to rise locally). Consider a scenario where
an attacker injects millions in fake currency in Manhattan, e.g., by
leaving bags full of bills in Central Park. The effect may be an increase
in local prices or a decrease in the trust people naturally afford to legal
tender: if the forgeries are indistinguishable from legitimate notes,
people will be tempted to try to spend this money, and those receiving
the notes, such as merchants, will face the conundrum of accepting all
notes, which may cause prices to rise, or refusing certain or all notes
for a period of time, thereby causing further disruption.
A variant of the attack would focus on a specific industrial sector,
rather than a geographic location, hoping to create ripple effects. For
instance, using a massive amount of counterfeit money to buy a
commodity like timber could, in the short-term, result in an artificial
increase in the price of timber; as a result, this could translate in an
artificial increase of the price of products or services associated with
timber, for instance increasing construction costs.
4. CONSTRAINTS ON THE COST OF COUNTERMEASURES
The above discussion suggests that techniques used to prevent
counterfeiting should remain economically efficient to justify changes
to the current approach of combining physical security and police
intervention. In other words, any (physical) digital cash protocols
proposed by cryptographers and computer scientists should reduce
the costs of policing without increasing significantly the production
and usage costs. In particular, digital solutions to counterfeiting
should meet two criteria.
A. SIMPLE UPGRADE
Any upgrade of the currency design is tightly constrained. Current
estimates suggest that the US government spends approximately lo
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cents per bill produced,59 which already represents a considerable
increase within the past few years-earlier versions of the Federal
Reserve Board reports placed the printing costs at about 5 cents per
bill in the early to mid-nineties. Any security extensions to physical
bills should impose a negligible overhead over current bill production
methods. Techniques that would raise the production cost of a bill to
20 cents, for instance, are unlikely to be adopted.
B. MINIMAL COST TO THE USERS
A number of failed currency innovations, such as efforts to
popularize dollar coins, 6o have shown that people are generally
conservative when it comes to currency, and tend to resist drastic
changes when they do not perceive any added value. Hence, to gain
widespread acceptance, a novel currency design must provide some
tangible benefits, yet avoid any possible perceived burdens. Namely,
the bill exchange process should not impose any additional
transaction cost (monetary or otherwise) to the user, and any
verification costs should remain negligible compared to the actual
value of a given bill.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENHANCED CURRENCY
In this Part, we extend the economic discussion of counterfeiting,
and the consideration of economic constraints for currency
deployment, to explore the usability and security properties that any
enhancement to currency (physical, digital or a combination thereof)
should aim for.
A. USABILITY PROPERTIES
Currency is a universal product, in that almost every individual
uses cash. Any changes to currency must therefore preserve the key
usability properties of cash. Namely, any proposed solution should
satisfy the following usability properties:
59 The Federal Reserve Board 2009, "New currency budget, 2009"
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/2oo9newcurrency.htm (last visited Aug.
30, 2010).
60 while it is still too early to deem the new dollar coin design featuring past presidents a
failure, production figures have been decreasing steadily [14], despite the "collector" value
provided as an adoption incentive to its users.
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Universal use. Any enhanced currency should provide the same
usage characteristics as current physical cash, offering extreme
ruggedness and enabling exchange without digital devices.
Reusability. A single bill should be reusable once it is passed
from one owner to another. Digital cash, on the other hand, is used
only once, and then destroyed.
B. SECURITY PROPERTIES
To resistant any type of counterfeiting, enhanced currency should
fulfill the following security properties:
Forgery-proof. Given an electronic verification device, it should
be impossible, or at least computationally infeasible, to create a bill
that is indistinguishable from one issued by a legitimate entity. In
other words, forgers cannot create bills with new denominations or
serial numbers; instead, they are limited to high-quality duplication of
existing bills.
Universal verifiability. We require that bills be verifiable using
a commodity electronic verification device. That way, individuals can
easily start verifying the correctness of bills. For instance, one of the
approaches we consider in this paper is to employ current camera-
equipped smart phones as verification devices, since these phones are
quickly becoming ubiquitous.
Useless duplication. Given an online electronic verification
device, it must be impossible to duplicate an existing bill and
successfully cash both bills. A single bill has at most a single owner at
any given time. This property does not imply that duplicating a bill is
impossible, but merely that the duplicated bill should be useless.
Anonymity. One of the most salient features of physical cash is
anonymity. Even though banknotes do not ensure perfect
anonymity,6 an enhanced currency system should provide a level of
anonymity equivalent to that provided by physical cash.
In addition to these usability and security properties, any solution
should also guarantee simple upgrades and minimal costs to users, as
discussed in the previous Part.
In essence, the above requirements describe the properties that
physical cash should ideally satisfy. With the exception of anonymity,
current physical cash designs do not satisfy most of the security
61 D. Kiigler, "On the anonymity of banknotes," (paper presented at the 4th International
Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET'o4), pages lO8-120, Toronto,
Canada, May 2004.)
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properties outlined above. Digital cash, on the other hand, may not
satisfy all usability (and economic) requirements.
Simultaneously meeting all security, usability, and economic
requirements is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In the
remainder of this paper we contrast several approaches, and show
which designs come the closest to satisfying all of our requirements.
As pointed out in the introduction, a combination of physical and
digital cash, seems more likely to satisfy the economic, security and
usability properties than either of physical or digital cash solutions,
especially considering consumers' reluctance to completely abandon
currency systems with which they are familiar.
V. PHYSICAL-DIGITAL CASH TECHNIQUES
In this Part we consider a number of techniques for designing a
physical-digital cash hybrid, including some novel proposals. We
evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages of each system.
A. BARCODE SIGNATURES
By encoding signatures in 2-D barcodes, we can 1) keep all the
properties of existing physical cash, and 2) strengthen the design
using cryptographic primitives to make forgery impossible. Simply
stated, this technique augments existing bills with an unforgeable
cryptographic signature.
Design. Since each bill already possesses a unique serial number,
N, the bill's issuing authority (e.g., federal bank) can sign the serial
number and the bill's denomination, D, with its private key, Rgov. The
associated public key, U9ov, should be widely published. While
traditional bills only contain N and D, physical-digital cash bills
contain (N,D,{N IID } ).
To preserve the rugedness of physical cash, the digital signature
on the bill could be embedded using a 2-D barcode, e.g., PDF417,6 2 as
shown in Figure i(a). 2-D barcodes have previously been used for
cryptographic verification of metered postage. 63 They allow fast
optical scans and are therefore easily verifiable.
62 S. Itkin and J. Martell, "A PDF417 Primer: a Guide to Understanding Second Generation
Bar Codes and Portable Data Files" Technical Report Monograph 8, Symbol Tech., April
1992.
63 J.D. Tygar, Bennet S. Yee, and Nevin Heintze, "Cryptographic Postage Indicia." In Proc.
ASIAN'96, Singapore, December 1996, pages 378-391.
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Such a barcode-enhanced bill does not contain more information
than a traditional bill: the signature itself can only be used to verify
the authenticity of a bill. Thus, the proposed scheme satisfies
reusability and anonymity requirements.
However, used alone, signatures cannot enforce the useless
duplication property. Indeed, a duplicated bill would have the same
serial number N as the original (valid) bill, so that (N, D, { N D} )
would remain valid. This implies that barcode signatures would nohfbe
fully effective solutions against counterfeiting. To achieve the useless
duplication property, we must turn to additional (or alternate)
techniques.
B. RFID-BASED PROTECTION
An alternative solution, which, as discussed in Part II, was once
considered for Euro bills,65 is to embed RFID chips in bills. Using an
RFID chip offers two primary advantages over 2-D barcodes. First, an
RFID chip can perform limited computations and can even interact
with a reader. Second, while 2-D barcodes are read-only, some RFID
chips have writable memory.
Design. If we assume the use of tamper-proof RFID chips (we
discuss the strength of this assumption below), then one can design a
simple protocol, similar to Seeing-is-Believing, 66 to authenticate
physical-digital cash. For a bill with serial number N, the issuing
authority generates a public-private key pair (KN, KN-{), stores
(KN,KA,{KN }R ) on the embedded RFID chip, and prints a
barcode encoding'of H(f{K-}R ) on the face of the bill, where H is
assumed to be a cryptographicaly secure hash function.
To authenticate a bill, any user with an appropriate reader can
transmit a randomly chosemronce, c, to the RFID chip. The chip
responds with a signature JKj KN on the nonce, its public key, KN-1,
and the certificate, {K 1 } R , for its public key. The reader checks the
signature using the public "key provided and checks that the hash of
the certificate matches the commitment printed on the face of the bill.
Evaluation. RFID chips will be less tolerant of daily wear and
tear and extreme environmental conditions than the original bill. As
65 Junko Yoshida, "Euro bank notes to embed RFID chips by 2005," EE Times (2001).
http://www.eetimes.com/ story/0EG20011219So016, December 2001.
66 Jonathan M. McCune, Adrian Perrig, and Michael K. Reiter, "Seeing-Is-Believing: Using
Camera Phones for Human-Verifiable Authentication." In Proc. IEEE Security and
Privacy, May 2005.
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such, an RFID-based approach may not fully satisfy the universal use
requirement. Further, at present, an RFID approach does not satisfy
the universal verifiability requirement, as RFID readers have not yet
penetrated the consumer market. Likewise, embedding a
computational device in each bill would significantly raise the cost per
bill (up to $1, that is, a lo-fold increase 67) and alter production
methods. While improvements in RFID technology may remedy this
drawback, this technique currently does not provide a simple
upgrade.
Since the data stored on the RFID chip does not include any
information about the owner of a bill, this technique achieves both
reusability and anonymity. A perfectly secure RFID chip may make
forgery and duplication impossible, thereby directly enforcing the
desired forgery-proof and useless duplication properties.
Unfortunately, trusting the security of an RFID chip is an extremely
strong assumption, as has been evidenced by existing attacks. 68 It
remains an open question whether similar techniques can be
developed using insecure RFID chips.
Finally, another disadvantage of RFID chips is that they can be
read remotely, potentially enabling a thief to determine the amount of
money a potential victim is carrying. Similar to the vulnerabilities of
the new RFID-based US passport,69 adding RFID tags to bills would
raise numerous new vulnerabilities.
C. PHYSICAL ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
A different way to ensure the useless duplication property is to
embed a physical one-way function in each bill.
Design. Physical one-way functions can be implemented, for
instance, by randomly sprinkling bits of optical fiber in the fabric of
each banknote,70 or by using magnetic polymers.71 Each bill has
67 Junko Yoshida, "Euro bank notes to embed RFID chips by 2005." EE Times (2001),
http://www.eetimes.com/ story/OEG20011219Soo6, December 2001.
68 S. Bono et al., "Security Analysis of a Cryptographically-Enabled RFID Device" (paper
presented at USENIX Security, Baltimore, MD, August 2005).
69 Bruce Schneier, "Renew Your Passport Now!" Last modified October 2006,
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-o61o.html.
70 G.J. Simmons, "Identification of Data, Devices, Documents and Individuals." In Proc.
Presented at the 25th Ann. Intern. Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Taipei,
Taiwan, ROC, October 1991, pages 197-218.
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unique characteristics due to the length and orientation of the fiber
strands or polymer present in its fabric, and it is extremely hard to
produce a copy of the bill with an identical physical configuration.
Exposing the bill to a light (or magnetic) source under different
conditions (e.g., different angles) yields a unique characterization of
the structure of the bill, this can be numerically encoded and printed
on the bill. Verification is a matter of exposing the bill to the same
conditions and matching the information printed on the bill.
Combining this scheme with a signature scheme, e.g., by signing the
value characterizing the physical structure of the bill can further
ensure the forgery-proof property.
Evaluation. This approach has the merit of providing enhanced
security without changing the way people would use bills. Three
important open problems remain, however, regardless of the physical
one-way function used. First, the manufacturing cost of such bills is
hard to assess, but is certainly much higher than the current
production cost. Second, fibers, or polymers may break or get dirtied
easily, resulting in genuine bills failing the verification process. Third,
the equipment needed to verify such enhanced bills is likely to be too
high an investment for most merchants, let alone individual users.
Due to the cost of the required verification equipment, forgeries may
travel undetected in the monetary network for considerable amounts
of time.
As such, physical one-way functions do not easily satisfy universal
verifiability, simple upgrade, or universal use. However, as we
discuss later, we believe physical one-way functions may be very
useful when deployed in conjunction with other techniques.
D. PAPER FINGERPRINTING
An idea closely related to physical one-way functions is discussed
in Clarkson et al.,72 which shows that imperfections in paper can be
measured, and used to characterize the uniqueness of a piece of paper.
Design. Clarkson et al. show that, for typical copy paper, one can
measure imperfections in the grain and structure of the paper. The
technique proposed consists in scanning the paper at different angles
with (cheap) commodity scanners, and to combine these
71 H. Hoshino et al., "Object to be checked for authenticity and a method for manufacturing
the same," February 1997. US Patent nr. 5,6Ol,931.
72 William Clarkson et al., "Fingerprinting Blank Paper Using Commodity Scanners" (paper
presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2009).
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measurements into a hash value. The hash can then be embedded on
the paper as a 2-D barcode, similar to the barcodes we discussed
earlier for authentication. Thus, one could modify the 2-D barcode we
proposed earlier to include (N,D,{N I D I S}R ) where S is a hash
characterizing the structure of the paper. Doing so, we can bind a
given sequence number and denomination to a paper structure, which
implements useless duplication. Indeed, a duplicate would have a
different paper structure (due to paper imperfections being random),
and consequently a different value S, which would not match the
printed barcode.
Evaluation. The idea of fingerprinting paper makes universal
verifiability, simple upgrade and universal use considerably easier to
satisfy than the physical one-way functions discussed before. Note
however, that a cellular phone reading the 2-D barcode would need to
obtain S by other means (e.g., external input coming from a scanner),
which would make the verification of S relatively cumbersome in
general.
Furthermore, paper fingerprinting needs to be more thoroughly
evaluated before we can be convinced of its feasibility for preventing
monetary counterfeits. First, currency is printed on specialized paper,
made for instance of cotton or plastic fibers and determining to what
extent existing techniques apply to currency paper is an open
question. Second, currency is subject to considerably rougher
handling than typical documents. Clarkson et al. show the resiliency of
their method to printing, scribbling and wetting and drying, which
seems very promising. However, compared to typical printed
documents, bills are smaller, constantly folded (which may alter the
structure significantly), and frequently dirtied. Overall, we would
expect the fingerprinting to be considerably more complex and to
potentially lead to false positives.
With these caveats in mind, the idea of fingerprinting paper, much
like the idea of using physical one-way functions, seems extremely
appealing when combined with the other techniques we describe in
this paper.
E. CENTRALIZED VERIFICATION
Both centralized and decentralized verification (discussed in Part
V.F) attempt to achieve the useless duplication property. While
neither provides a completely satisfactory solution, both represent
interesting points in the design space.
Design. One simple way of making duplication more costly for
counterfeiters is to keep a database of issued serial numbers at the
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issuing central bank, and require that all banks are able to quickly
verify whether a given serial number has already been deposited or
not. We can thus ensure that two bills with the same serial number
cannot be deposited at the same time. Adding a cryptographic
signature on the bill would both prevent the introduction of
illegitimate serial numbers and detect the duplication legitimate serial
numbers. Without the cryptographic signature, this technique directly
applies to unmodified physical cash, but it offers weaker properties,
since it can only detect the introduction of illegitimate serial numbers
when the bills are deposited at a bank.
Evaluation. Given that centralized verification utilizes
unmodified physical cash, it clearly meets our universal use and
reusability goals. It imposes no additional production (marginal)
costs, making it a simple upgrade to the printing process. However, it
does impose fixed costs on the central bank, which must maintain the
serial number database, as well as on the member banks that must
constantly monitor and report on the serial numbers entering and
leaving their control. Centralized verification minimally impacts the
traditional anonymity of physical cash, since the bills remained
unchanged, and serial number data is already available at the member
banks.
Without barcode signatures, centralized verification of serial
numbers is only partially forgery-proof and provides only limited
verifiability, since only banks can perform the verification procedure.
Further, duplicate bills can remain in circulation undetected for
extended periods of time. In fact, until one of the bills is deposited,
not even the central bank knows that duplication has occurred.
F. DECENTRALIZED VERIFICATION
Ideally, with a distributed verification scheme, we could achieve
instant detection of duplicates, such that no one would accept a
duplicate bill. Decentralized verification attempts to achieve this
property by enabling individuals and merchants to perform real-time
validation of bills they receive. The novel system we discuss here
offers stronger properties, but it also imposes larger costs and may
introduce new vulnerabilities. While it does not offer a perfect
solution, it does suggest a direction for further research. Indeed, the
increasing ability of engineers to design large-scale, distributed
databases may prove a valuable asset in counterfeit prevention.
Relying on the assistance of online servers, which would have been
unthinkable only a few years ago, is becoming a credible proposition.
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Design. At a high level, a decentralized database (perhaps hosted
by various member banks or other governmental agencies) associates
each bill's serial number with a cryptographic "lock bit". Once a bill is
locked, only the current "owner" of the bill can unlock it. To transfer
ownership of a locked bill, the current owner cryptographically
unlocks it and allows the new owner to lock it. Participants can check
the current state of a particular bill's lock bit and may refuse to accept
a locked bill.
While we refer to this bit as a "lock bit" throughout, it merely
implements a warning system, rather than an actual enforcement
(blocking) mechanism: users can elect to receive bills even if the lock
bit is on, but do so at their own risk.
Furthermore, dealing with legacy users (i.e., those that cannot
check a bill's lock status) requires additional precautions. In general,
before transferring a locked bill to a legacy user, the current owner
should unlock it so that the legacy user can make use of it unhindered.
By default, all bills dispensed by an ATM to a legacy user would be
unlocked (or locked with a null value) by the issuing bank.
Participating users would then take ownership of the bills by
immediately locking them.
On a related note, since a legacy user cannot check the status of a
bill's lock bit, a participating user might accidentally or maliciously
provide them with a locked bill. A similar problem arises if a
participating user loses the cryptographic material necessary to unlock
their own bills. To address this problem, the decentralized verification
service must be backed by the central bank. We assume that the
central bank can distinguish a duplicate from a real bill through some,
possibly costly, verification process. For instance, physical one-way
functions or the type of paper fingerprinting described above could
assist in the bank's verification process. Indeed, used as a back-up
verification system, physical one-way functions do not need to have
the same level of robustness as when used as the primary mechanism
to prevent duplication.
With this decentralized verification system in place, a user could
deposit a locked bill at a bank in a procedure similar to that used for
checks today. The bank would send the locked bill back to the treasury
to verify its authenticity. If the bill is authentic, the bank will credit the
value of the bill to the user's account, regardless of its lock status.
Implementation. In Appendix A, we describe in more detail
how such a distributed locking scheme can be implemented in an
anonymous manner, using one-time public/private key pairs. The
scheme essentially consists of a short series of messages between two
participants in a transaction and the bank.
[Vol. 7:2
CHRISTIN, ACQUISTI, PARNO AND PERRIG
Evaluation. Given that the only modification of the actual
physical currency is the encoding of each bill's serial number in a
machine-readable form, decentralized verification achieves the same
strong universal use property as the barcode signatures, and as far as
the production process is concerned, only requires a simple upgrade.
While transfers between participants become more complicated than
with standard physical cash, physical-digital cash with decentralized
verification can still be used by, and exchanged with, legacy users that
do not have the appropriate electronic devices. This also implies that
this technique satisfies the reusability requirement.
Both the locking procedure described above (and any checks on
the lock status) will fail if the serial number provided does not exist, so
anyone with a scanner can determine the authenticity of a particular
bill, making the currency forgery-proof Since anyone with an online
connection can query the lock status of a particular bill, this technique
also provides universal verifiability. Current smart phones have
access to a high-speed Internet network enabling them to establish a
secure communication channel with the bank. Short-range wireless
communication capabilities can be secured using known techniques73,
and used to transfer bills between participants.
The stored information for each bill consists of the double (N, X).
With about 20 billion bills currently in circulation,74 and the
conservative assumption that each double (N, X) requires 64 bytes, the
total size of the database is about 1 TB, a small number compared to
other existing highly-available databases such as web indexes75.
Decentralized verification provides a reasonable level of protection
against duplication by using a distributed network of verifiers to
enforce the principal of useless duplication. A participant in the
system that receives an unlocked duplicate should immediately lock it,
preventing any of the copies from being locked by other participants.
Transferring a duplicate to another participant has a similar effect. If a
forgery does occur, it drives all bills back to the bank, since merchants
will not accept duplicates of a bill once the first bill has been locked.
This allows easier monitoring and can yield clues for enforcement.
73 Jonathan M. McCune, Adrian Perrig, and Michael K. Reiter, "Seeing-Is-Believing: Using
Camera Phones for Human-Verifiable Authentication," In Proc. IEEE Security and
Privacy, May 2005.
,4 U.S. Department of Treasury. Treasury Bulletin, June 2007. http://www.fms.treas.gov/
bulletin/.
75 Fay Chang et al., "Bigtable: A Distributed Storage System for Structured Data" (paper
presented at ACM/USENIX OSDI'o6,, 2006).
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The primitive does come at a usage cost, though: users forgetting to
lock unlocked bills may actually see their valid currency be
subsequently rejected, ifforgeries with the same number are present
in the system. Given the relatively modest amount of high quality
forgeries in circulation, compared to the total number of bills, we
think that this is unlikely to occur. Recall that our threat model
assumes a relatively limited number of very high quality forgeries,
rather than a vast amount of low quality forgeries, which can be
detected much more easily.
Because one can implement the exchange protocol using only
transient random numbers that cannot be matched to any real-world
identity, the transfer protocol does not in itself appear to degrade
anonymity of physical cash. A thornier issue is that of accesses to the
online database. In the exchange protocol we propose, the bank B
knows when user A wants to spend the bill N, since A contacts B
directly. By extension, as long as the bills are passed between
principals that use bill scanners and locking primitives, B has a way of
reconstructing the whole transaction chain. Because the
communications between A and B never involve the names of the
principals (no message include the names A or C), the problem can be
solved by using anonymous communication primitives7 6 that make it
impossible for the bank to identify A. This system could achieve
reasonable levels of anonymity, possibly at the expense of added
latency.
Decentralized verification, thanks to the (un)locking primitives,
can also help combat theft. A wallet full of locked bills is useless to a
thief. Ownership has not been relinquished, and the money cannot be
deposited or exchanged with any participant in the system. Also, the
owner of the locked bills retains the serial numbers and unlocking
codes for the stolen bills, and can provide this information to the
authorities: The thief cannot deposit the money at a bank by claiming
to have lost the unlocking codes. These benefits may encourage
adoption, since only participants in the system will have this
protection. As a drawback, under that scheme, legitimate users
forgetting to request unlocked bills when they have a right to do so
could have a harder time justifying the money is indeed theirs, but we
presume this type of user error would become rare once people get
more familiar with the system.
76 E.g., David Chaum, "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital
Pseudonyms" Comm. A CM 42 (1981); Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and
Paul Syverson, "Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router" (paper presented at the
13th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2004).
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In sum, none of the techniques discussed here perfectly meet all
requirements outlined in Part IV. However, a combination of these
techniques represents interesting and useful building blocks for future
physical-digital cash schemes.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The various techniques outlined above for implementing physical-
digital cash raise a number of questions regarding possible
vulnerabilities of physical-digital cash.
A. COMPROMISED PRIVATE KEYS
If the private key Rgov used for signing the bills is compromised,
physical-digital cash is not forgery-proof anymore, and the security
level degrades to that of physical cash. Unfortunately, the public may
rely on the cryptography as hard evidence that a bill is legitimate,
rather than also checking other security signs, such as physical
watermarks.
While the issuing government should immediately replace the key
pair Rgov, Ugov, recalling all bills signed with the compromised key may
prove problematic. Massive recalls have been shown possible in
practice, e.g., by the recent shift from all national European currencies
to the Euro, but large-scale recalls are costly and take several years to
be effective. A possible way to mitigate the risk of a key compromise is
to use different keys for each denomination, e.g., $20 bills, produced
at a given facility, and with a limited lifetime. Limiting the number of
bills involved would facilitate a relatively rapid recall in case of a key
compromise.
B. FAKE SIGNATURES
Another class of attack consists of attacks on the signature itself.
We are not concerned by cryptographic attacks here, but by physical
attacks on the signature information. For instance, fake bills may be
produced with missing or incorrect digital signatures. A missing
signature is very easy to notice, but while an incorrect signature can be
easily detected using a bill scanner, it is not easy to detect in the off-
line realm: there is no obvious visual distinction between a good and a
bad signature.
Worse, the visible presence of a digital signature (e.g., the
presence of a 2-D barcode) may convince users that the bill is good,
even in the absence of verification. From a psychological standpoint, a
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bill may look more trustworthy just because of the apparent presence
of a digital signature, even though other physical indicators, e.g., the
quality of the paper, or the presence of a watermark, may be
questionable.
C. ROGUE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Serious problems may arise when a rogue financial institution
(e.g., bank, foreign currency exchange shop) participates in
exchanges. One whole class of attacks can be characterized as "money
laundering," that is, in the context of counterfeit money, exchanging
fake bills for good bills. The simplest instance of such an attack is
when a dishonest merchant tries to pass bad bills onto customers.
This type of attack is not new, and in fact already affects the existing
physical cash network. Countermeasures are simple: in the physical
cash network, individuals are supposed to check the physical
properties of a given bill. In the physical-digital cash network,
individuals can use readers (e.g., applications on their smart phones
for barcode signatures, miniaturized RFID readers, etc., depending on
the technique employed) to thwart this problem.
A more elaborate version of money laundering involves an
attacker colluding with a rogue bank, which cashes counterfeited bills
produced by the attacker without checking them. The counterfeited
bills are then sent to the currency exchange office of the bank, where
they are exchanged for good foreign currency bills from unsuspecting
tourists. As long as bills are not verified and no one attempts to lock
them, they may travel in the network. Monitoring banks is a plausible
countermeasure against such an attack. Compared to the large
number of bill users, there are relatively few banks in the world, so a
centralized authority (e.g., a treasury department) could monitor
them effectively. Recent events indicate that such monitoring already
exists in practice.77
Another variant on the money laundering scheme is that used by a
rogue foreign exchange shop that does not just accept, but also gives
out popular foreign currency (e.g., U.S. dollars) in a different country
(e.g., Japan). These shops are much less regulated and less
controllable than banks. However, for a popular currency, we expect
the flow of money to be mostly from the tourists to the foreign
exchange shops (e.g., backpackers exchanging US dollars for local
77 S. Mihm, "No Ordinary Counterfeit," New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006,
36.
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currency), so the impact of this attack should be limited. Further, in
all money laundering attacks, counterfeit bills are detected as soon as
the bill is deposited at a legitimate institution, or passed to an
individual equipped with a bill scanner.
D. DENIAL OF SERVICE
While currency is usually not subject to denial of service attacks,
an online locking mechanism as described in Part V. does potentially
introduce new DoS vulnerabilities. Assume that the adversary can
create duplicates of existing bills at will. For a nation-scale adversary,
this can be done relatively easily, for instance, by asking a large
number of people to take pictures of valid bills, or to have a few spies
take pictures of a large number of bills stored in banks. Now, consider
one legitimate note L with serial number N, and its copy F, which has
the same serial number N. L is unlocked as soon as it is passed from a
merchant, bank, or individual with the proper equipment to a "legacy
principal" which does not have any means to lock bills. The attacker
can figure out if L is unlocked by repeatedly trying to lock the note
using a null value as the current locking value. As soon as the note L is
detected to be unlocked, the attacker issues F. If F is locked before L, L
becomes impossible to spend even though it is a valid bill. The only
way for the unfortunate owner of L to get his money is to confirm with
the treasury that L is, in fact, a valid bill, relying on physical features
of the bill, e.g., a physical one-way function.
The central bank may then decide to recall the serial number N,
but this gives the attacker a way of destroying money, which can lead
to sabotage operations. For instance, the attacker may start issuing
many copies of bills to disrupt the monetary system by having a large
number of users requesting that the treasury check their bills, and
having, as a final result, vast amounts of serial numbers destroyed.
While the attacker does not gain any money from such a destructive
scheme, this type of attack may exert significant pressure on the
monetary system targeted.
While potentially serious, these vulnerabilities already exist with
physical cash. The presence of a verification system does improve the
situation, by making it easier and faster to detect criminal activity.
Although the issue of locking a bill held by a legacy principal seems
cumbersome at first glance, since the principal will need to deposit the
bill at a bank for verification, this action is always due to criminal
activity. This should be fairly infrequent, and actually provides an
incentive for people to adopt verification devices.
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VII. DISCUSSION
With the objective to significantly strengthen current bills against
high-quality monetary forgery, we have highlighted a set of
requirements that are needed for a viable solution. Then, we have
looked at possible ways to implement these requirements, by
augmenting bills with cryptographic material directly embedded in
the bill. We have considered optically verifiable cryptographic
signatures expressed as 2-D barcodes, RFID chips, physical one-way
functions, centralized verification and decentralized verification.
None of the techniques we investigate or propose, when used in
isolation, satisfies all the properties we would like to enforce. Each is
characterized by unique trade-offs. For some of them, the usability or
upgrade costs associated with their implementation may outweigh the
current expected benefits of such an implementation. However, a
combination of these techniques - for instance, coupling a
decentralized verification protocol with optical signatures, and with
physical one-way functions serving as back-up - could come very
close to implementing all the security and usability requirements we
described, and certain economic conditions may justify their adoption.
To avoid deployment issues, decentralized verification schemes
should be designed to accommodate legacy users who do not wish to
participate in the online verification scheme. More importantly,
deployment need not be universal. By driving forgeries back to the
banks quickly, a decentralized system should work effectively as a
deterrent against counterfeiting, even in the absence of wide
deployment. Likewise, it is also possible that implementing only a
subset of the techniques discussed in the paper may be enough to
discourage most fraud. A design solely based on 2-D barcodes will
limit forgeries to duplication of existing bills, and even such
duplication would be readily detected.
From an economic standpoint, the added costs of a basic scheme,
solely consisting of embedded barcodes, are extremely low: bar-coded
signatures could be added to existing notes using available presses. Its
impact on the attacker's cost benefit analysis would nevertheless be
significant as an attacker would now be physically limited in his ability
to create fake notes by the number of legitimate notes he can put his
hands on. This would increase his costs and reduce the amount of
notes it can produce in a given amount of time. The attacker will still
be able, of course, to make many copies of the same note and attempt
to flood a market with that note. Our economic discussion suggests
that such a simple solution may actually be the most desirable given
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the relatively small impact of forgeries on macroeconomics, and the
reasonably high efficiency of policing methods already in place.
If the economics of counterfeiting were to change - for instance, if
we start noticing large cities being flooded with rogue currency - it
may make sense to consider combining offline primitives with a
verification system. Such a strategy would decrease the cost of
detecting duplicates for the defender. Indeed, it would make it more
likely that the counterfeit note will be detected, more likely that it will
be detected early in its introduction into the system, and more likely
that its exchanges will be tracked.
The added costs of a complete scheme combining physical
protection with decentralized verification would be significant. Such a
scheme indeed implies higher fixed costs, including equipment costs
and transition costs, such as the cost of adopting scanners for banks,
merchants, and, in the long term, principals, as well as higher variable
costs (e.g., the transaction costs associated with the time spent
scanning currency and connecting to an online database whenever a
note must be locked or unlocked).
Nevertheless, similar fixed transition costs have been incurred
before by large economies - for instance, the transition to electronic
check-out cashiers, or the transition to the Euro within some EU
member states. One advantage of the scheme we have discussed is
that it allows for an arbitrarily long transition period, since the
decentralized verification system is essentially used as a warning tool;
only when bills get back to the bank does detection (and possibly
destruction) of forged banknotes take place. Overall, the variable
transaction costs would chiefly depend on how technology will blend
into the everyday usage of cash and how seamlessly the locking and
unlocking process can be integrated into existing merchant
infrastructures. The economic discussion we present in this paper
tends to suggest that, under the current conditions, the costs would
actually outweigh the benefits of such an implementation; however,
we also discuss a number of plausible scenarios/attacks that could
considerably alter the economic proposition.
More generally, a deeper consideration of the economics at stake in
the production and deployment process of counterfeit-resistant bills
warrants further research. We hope that our initial approaches will
encourage additional efforts in this important area.
AN ONLINE VERIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION
To implement the online verification scheme described in Part
V.F, the "bank" (e.g., the central bank or the treasury), denoted B,
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maintains a distributed database that contains an entry for each bill in
circulation. Each entry is of the form (N, A), where N represents the
bill's serial number and A indicates the lock status of that bill. If A =0,
the bill is unlocked, whereas any non-zero value indicates that it is
locked. To facilitate the automation of the steps described below, each
bill's serial number should be encoded in a machine-readable form
such as a 2-D barcode.
To lock an unlocked bill with serial number N, a principal (e.g., an
individual or merchant) A picks a random value UA and computes AA =
H(pA), where H is a one-way hash function assumed to be secure, i.e.,
at least weak-collision resistant. Using the bank's public key,78 A
securely transmits (N, AA) to the bank. The bank will update the
database appropriately. We summarize these steps below:
1. A-> B: {N, PA,}U,_
2. Retrieve (N,2), check 2=0, store (N, AA).
To transfer the bill to another principal, C, A will unlock the bill
and simultaneously lock it under Cs lock value. To simplify the
presentation, assume A and C have established a secret key KAc, and
let denote the authenticated encryption of a message M. When the
transaction is about to take place, C picks a secret random value uc,
and computes its hash Ac = H (pc). The following bill transfer protocol
takes place:
1. C -- A: {IC }Kc
2. A -- B {N,PA,21c }Ugo,
3. B: Retrieve (N, A), check 2A=H(pA), store (N, 2 c)
4. B-> A: {N,2 c}R o
5. A-> C: {N, Ac }Rgo_
78 As before, the bank's public key is Ugo, and its private key is Rgou. These keys need not be
identical to the keys used to authenticate bills through the 2-D barcode. The bank's
s gnture on message M is given by { M} R , and public-key encryption of M is denoted by
M fUgo g
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That is, C gives A the lock value Ac, which A forwards to the bank
along with her unlocking value pA. The bank replaces AA with Ac,
effectively updating the "owner" of the bill, before communicating the
change back to A. Finally, A relays this information to C, proving that
the lock value has been updated, and physically transmits the bill to C.
The key feature of this scheme is that, if the values PA and 1Uc are
truly chosen at random, bills can be locked to a given individual
without making this individual traceable. Basically, (JA, AA) and (Pc,
Ac) are used as one-time public-private key pairs.
The above exchange protocol assumes that both A and C are able
to participate in an online exchange. If C, for example, is unable to
participate in an online exchange, because it does not have a bill
scanner or does not wish to use it, then A simply unlocks the bill and
leaves it in the unlocked state. This can be accomplished with a
protocol similar to the locking protocol, namely:
1. A -> B fN,,Uo0l ,
2. B: Retrieve (N,2), check 2=H (PA), store (NO).
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